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Under Kemp’s Eye: Analyzing the
Constitutionality of the Heartbeat
Restriction in Georgia’s LIFE Act
and its Potential Impact on
Abortion Law*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current state of women’s right to bodily autonomy in the United
States has eerily begun to resemble that of the dystopian society
depicted in The Handmaid’s Tale.1 While abortion rates have steadily
declined over the last decade, the attempts by state legislatures to
restrict or completely take away women’s right to abortion have
exponentially increased.2 In the first six months of 2019 alone, five
states passed laws placing restrictions on abortion. 3 These restrictions
range from limiting the time frame in which a woman may obtain an
abortion to when a fetal heartbeat has been detected—normally around

*I would like to thank Professor Jim Fleissner for all his advice and guidance during
the writing and editing processes for this Comment and for his continued passion and
excitement for the law, which inspired me to take on this topic. I would also like to thank
my mom and dad for their continued unwavering love, support, and encouragement.
1. A novel by Margaret Atwood in which the United States is a totalitarian society
ruled by a fundamentalist regime that treats women as property of the state and forces
them to procreate.
2. Rebecca Wind, Abortion Is a Common Experience for U.S. Women, Despite
Dramatic Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, https://www.guttmacher.org/newsrelease/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-women-despite-dramatic-declines-rates (last
visited Nov. 16, 2019).
3. Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six Weeks, Before Most
People
Know
They
are
Pregnant,
GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE,
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/03/surge-bans-abortion-early-six-weeks-mostpeople-know-they-are-pregnant (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
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six weeks—to a complete ban and criminalization of the procedure.4 In
addition to the states that have successfully enacted restrictions,
another ten states have either introduced or moved to enact restrictions
on abortion.5
So how is it that all of these new laws are constitutional? The short
answer is that they are not.6 The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated that “[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree, and
we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest
stage.”7 However, the country seems to have moved far beyond the
ability to agree to disagree and is now demanding with each new
restriction that the Court yet again reevaluate its stance on abortion.
On May 7, 2019, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed the Living
Infants Fairness and Equality (LIFE) Act 8 into law.9 The LIFE Act is
among the most restrictive abortion laws that have been introduced this
year.10 While the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia has granted a preliminary injunction that prohibits the LIFE
Act from initially taking effect, the fate of Georgia’s abortion law still
remains in question.11
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the heartbeat
restriction in the LIFE Act.12 Part II outlines the history of abortion
laws in the United States and the current precedent set by the Supreme
4. Id. Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Mississippi have all passed a sixweek ban on abortion. Missouri has enacted an eight-week ban, and Alabama has
managed to ban abortion completely and criminalize the performance of the procedure. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. In fact, most states are deliberately enacting these radical bans knowing that
they are in violation of current precedent in an effort to advance the cases up to the
Supreme Court.
7. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
8. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 234.
9. Kelly Krause, Georgia Governor Signs Almost Total Ban on Abortion, CENTER FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/georgia-governor-signsalmost-total-ban-onabortion?s_src=19GAUSCASES&s_src=19GA&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI177e9pSu5AIV0pFb
Ch0DKwAXEAAYASAAEgL__fD_BwE (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
10. Elizabeth Chuck, Georgia’s law that blocks most abortions is unconstitutional,
lawsuit says, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/georgia-s-law-blocks-most-abortionsunconstitutional-lawsuit-says-n1024471 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
11. Order, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Kemp, No.
1:19-CV-02973 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2019).
12. While the LIFE Act includes several changes to Georgia’s abortion law, this
Comment will focus only on the provision of the law that prohibits abortion once a fetal
heartbeat has been detected.
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Court. Part III addresses the current abortion law in Georgia, the
changes the LIFE Act will make if it is eventually permitted to take
effect, and discusses the pending case that challenges the
constitutionality of the law. Part IV discusses the constitutionality of
the new law and what it would mean for the future of both Georgia and
abortion laws across the United States if the law were to be held
constitutional.
II. THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING ABORTION
LAW
The Supreme Court of the United States first announced its stance
on abortion forty-five years ago in Roe v. Wade,13 but as time would tell,
this would not be the last and definitive decision on the matter. 14 While
it is beginning to feel like the ongoing struggle to balance women’s right
to choose with states’ interest in protecting potential human life has
been going on for centuries, abortion regulation has only been a
relevant topic on the national stage since the late nineteenth century. 15
In order to better understand the evolution of the new restrictions, it is
important to first consider the rationale behind the precedent currently
in place.
A. Laying Down the Law
In 1973, the Supreme Court reviewed a case challenging the
constitutionality of a Texas statute that made it a crime to obtain or to
attempt to obtain an abortion other than out of necessity to save a
woman’s life.16 To begin its analysis, the Court listed three main
reasons behind historic abortion restrictions: (1) they were the product
of a Victorian social concern to discourage sexual conduct; (2) to protect
pregnant women from submitting to a procedure that placed their lives
in serious jeopardy; and (3) to protect prenatal life. 17 Since the Court
reasoned that the first reason was an outdated notion from a different
era, and that the second reason was obsolete due to the advances of

13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Id. at 164–65.
15. Id. at 129.
[T]he restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today
are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or
its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve
the pregnant woman’s life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin.
Id.
16. Id. at 117–18.
17. Id. at 147–52.
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modern medicine making abortion procedures virtually risk-free, the
only reason the Court seemed to put merit in was the state’s interest in
protecting prenatal life.18
1. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment19 creates an individual right to privacy.20
However, this right to privacy extends only to those rights that can be
deemed fundamental to and implicit in the definition of liberty. 21 These
rights tend to include the guarantee of personal privacy in activities
such as marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education.22 It follows that the right to bodily
autonomy is also based in the Due Process Clause. 23 In recognizing this
right of privacy, the Court determined that denying a woman the right
to choose for herself whether or not to obtain an abortion would be an
invasion of her right to privacy and detrimental to her physical and
emotional well-being.24
However, the Court held that the right to abortion is not absolute. 25
At a certain point in the pregnancy, the state has a compelling interest
in regulating abortion.26 Where an individual’s fundamental rights are
involved, state legislation meant to regulate these rights may be
justified only if there is a compelling state interest and the regulation is
narrowly tailored so as only to protect that specific interest. 27 Such
18. Id. at 154.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
21. Id. at 152.
22. Id. at 152–53.
23. Jared H. Jones, Annotation, Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion,
and Governmental Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 1,
§ 2 (2007). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Denying a woman an abortion could potentially cause her
mental and physical harm, as well as distress associated with having an unwanted child
and the inability to care for the child. Id.
25. Id. at 155.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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state interests include protecting the health of state citizens,
maintaining medical standards, and protecting prenatal life. 28
In order to ensure that the interest of the state and the fundamental
rights of the individual remained balanced, the Court held that abortion
laws should be based on a trimester framework.29 Under this
framework, the Court held that during the first trimester of pregnancy,
a state does not have a compelling interest, and therefore may not place
any regulation on abortion.30 The decision to end a pregnancy remains
with the individual and her attendant physician pre-viability.31 During
the second trimester, the state has a sufficiently compelling interest in
the health of the mother and is permitted to regulate abortion in ways
that reasonably relate to maternal health. 32 Finally, during the third
trimester when the fetus is considered viable, the state’s interest in
potential human life becomes compelling enough to justify strict
regulations or bans on abortion.33 The Court defined viability as the
point when a fetus has the capability to survive outside the womb.34
The Court concluded that the Texas statute was unconstitutional
because it made no distinction between abortions performed in early
stages of pregnancy and those in later stages, it only allowed abortions
to be performed in order to save a woman’s life, and it did not
adequately consider the compelling interest of a woman’s right to
privacy in making decisions regarding her body.35
2. Defining Who is a Person Under the Constitution
While the Court in Roe refused to make a ruling on exactly when life
begins, the Court stated that the privacy protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend to an unborn fetus. 36 The Constitution of
the United States does not explicitly define the term “person;” however,
the term is used in several different provisions.37 None of the provisions
28. Jones, supra note 23, at § 2.
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63.
30. Id. at 163.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 164.
33. Id. at 164–65.
34. Id. at 164.
35. Id. at 164.
36. Id. at 158.
37. Id. at 157. There are multiple provisions that use the term “person” to describe to
whom the provision is meant to apply: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Qualifications for
Members of the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Appointment of
Representatives and Taxes); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Qualifications of Senators); U.S.

[21] COMMENT - SIZEMORE BP (DO NOT DELETE)

422

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:32 AM

[Vol. 71

seem to indicate that they could possibly ever have a prenatal
application. Therefore, a state may not legislate in a manner that would
protect a fetus’s potential rights as though they were recognized under
the Fourteenth Amendment.38
B. Modification to the Law Announced in Roe
Nineteen years after the Supreme Court declared that “the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its
early stages, [the] definition of liberty” was again at issue.39 In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,40 physicians and
abortion clinics in Pennsylvania brought a suit seeking injunctive relief
in an attempt to keep five provisions of a new state abortion law from
taking effect.41 The plaintiffs claimed that the provisions violated the
standard set out in Roe and were therefore unconstitutional. 42 A
plurality of the Court began by stating that the opinion reaffirms the
stance that was taken in Roe and maintains its essential propositions.43
Specifically, the Court reaffirmed its recognition of (1) a woman’s right
to choose to have an abortion pre-viability without undue interference
from the state; (2) the state’s interest in regulating abortions after the
point of viability; and (3) the state’s compelling interest from the outset
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (Powers Prohibited to United States; Migration or Importation of
Persons; Head Tax); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (Titles of Nobility; Presents and
Emoluments From Foreign States to Officers of United States); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
2 (Presidential Electors); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (Meeting of Electors); U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (Qualifications, Office of President); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2
(Extradition); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (Fugitive Slaves); U.S. CONST. amend. V
(Grand Jury; Double Jeopardy; Self–Incrimination; Due Process; Takings); U.S. CONST.
amend. XII (Presidential Electors); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–3 (Citizenship;
Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection; Appointment of
Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement); U.S. CONST.
amend XXII (Limitation on Presidential Terms).
38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158; Jones, supra note 23, at § 2.
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
40. Id. at 833.
41. Id. at 844.
42. Id. The five provisions in question required (1) a woman seeking an abortion to
give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specified that she be given
certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion was performed; (2) informed
consent from one of the parents of a minor, but provided for a judicial bypass option if the
minor did not wish to or could not obtain a parent’s consent; (3) a married woman who
was seeking an abortion was required to sign a statement indicating that she had notified
her husband of her intended abortion; and (4) imposed certain reporting requirements on
facilities that provided abortion services. The fifth provision was an exception for
abortions due to medical emergency. Id.
43. Id. at 845–46.
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of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and potential
human life.44 The Court again recognized the liberty it first announced
in Roe, that a woman has a fundamental right to be free from intrusion
of intimate and personal life decisions, such as having a child. 45
However, the Court held that the rigid trimester framework in Roe was
unworkable, therefore rejecting it, and instead announced a new
framework under which the constitutionality of an abortion law should
be analyzed.46
1. The New Undue Burden Test
The Court decided that, instead of a trimester framework, the line
should be drawn at viability, which was defined as the “time at which
there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life
outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life
can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now
overrides the rights of the woman.”47 By drawing the line at viability,
the Court was better able to balance a woman’s liberty and right to
bodily autonomy with that of the state’s interest in potential human
life.48
In order to clarify the new viability standard, the Court declared that
“[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” 49 Under the
undue burden standard, a state regulation should be found
unconstitutional when it places a substantial obstacle in the way of a
woman who is attempting to obtain an abortion pre-viability.50 The
purpose of the state regulation must be to further the interest in
potential human life and the health of the mother, not to hinder a
woman’s right to choose.51 If a court finds that the means a regulation
uses to protect the state’s interest places a substantial obstacle in the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 846.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 877.
Id.
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path of a woman’s right to choose pre-viability, the regulation is
unconstitutional despite the compelling purpose.52
Placing a regulation on abortion pre-viability does not necessarily
guarantee that the regulation will be found unconstitutional. The Court
has held that a state may place regulations on abortion during the previability period with the purpose of ensuring that a woman is
thoroughly informed and may encourage her to consider all options
when making her decision.53 The Court has also upheld regulations that
place a required waiting period between an informational meeting and
the performance of the procedure for the purpose of ensuring that a
woman has fully contemplated her decision. 54 Regulations requiring a
physician to determine if a fetus is viable prior to the performance of
the procedure have been upheld, so long as the regulation leaves the
determination of viability to the discretion of the examining physician. 55
The Court concluded that, when analyzing the Pennsylvania statute
under the new undue burden standard, the provisions that required a
married woman to notify her husband and get consent from him prior to
obtaining an abortion placed a substantial obstacle in the way of her
exercising her right to choose and was therefore unconstitutional. 56 The
other provisions of the statute were upheld as being constitutional. 57
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The majority opinion in Casey consists of a plurality opinion, which
was discussed above, written by Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy,
and Justice Souter.58 The other two votes that make up the majority for
this decision came from Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, both of
whom concur in part, concur in the judgment in part, and dissent in
part.59
Justice Stevens began his opinion by stating that he agreed with the
portion of the plurality opinion that reaffirmed the central holding in
52. Id. Regulations that merely create a structural mechanism by which the state can
express its interest for potential life are permitted, if the mechanism is not a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s right to choose. Id. at 877–78.
53. Id. at 872.
54. Jones, supra note 23, at § 2.
55. Id.
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
57. Id. at 900–01. The case was remanded to consider the severability of the statutory
provisions in order to determine if the statute could still be upheld after removing the
provisions that were found unconstitutional. Id.
58. Id. at 843.
59. Id. at 911; id. at 922.
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Roe, because it is an “integral part of a correct understanding of both
the concept of liberty and basic equality of men and women.”60 Justice
Stevens also concurred with the plurality opinion’s conclusion that the
Constitution does not recognize any rights provided to an unborn fetus
under the Fourteenth Amendment.61 Justice Stevens’s dissent stemmed
from the fact that the plurality opinion rejected the trimester
framework announced in Roe and how that framework applies to a
state’s interest.62 Justice Stevens argued that it is not a contradiction to
allow a state to have a compelling interest in potential human life and
to also conclude that the interest does not justify the regulation of
abortion pre-viability.63
Justice Blackmun concurred in the reaffirmation of the central
holding of Roe, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment established a fundamental liberty that protects a woman’s
right to have an abortion.64 Justice Blackmun’s dissent stemmed from
his belief that the trimester framework in Roe had not been
undermined in the nineteen years since the case was decided, and that
the framework was far more workable and not as easily manipulated as
the new undue burden standard adopted by the plurality opinion. 65
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia both concurred in the
judgment in part and dissented in part, and were joined by Justice
White and Justice Thomas.66 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that he and the three other dissenting Justices believed that Roe
was incorrectly decided and should be overruled. 67 Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the argument that abortion is a fundamental right
under the Constitution and would instead apply a rational basis review

60. Id. at 912 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 912–14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[A]n abortion is not the “termination of life entitled to fourteenth amendment
protection.” From this holding, there was no dissent . . . indeed, no Member of
the Court has ever questioned this fundamental proposition. Thus, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a “person”
does not have what is sometimes described as a “right to life.”
Id. at 913 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 914 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 923–24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 930–31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that while
the plurality opinion claimed that it was upholding the central holding of Roe based on
stare decisis, the opinion revised the standard in Roe until it existed “only in the way a
storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere façade to give the illusion of reality.” Id.
at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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when analyzing the constitutionality of abortion laws. 68 Justice Scalia
also rejected abortion as a fundamental right and took his opinion a
step further, stating that the decision to regulate or prohibit abortion
should be left entirely up to the states. 69
3. Determining if Precedent Should be Overturned
The main argument continuously made by the opponents of Roe and
its progeny is that the decisions upholding the right to abortion should
be overturned. Precedent is not overturned due to the change in
popularity of a particular viewpoint or even due to the shifting of
political regimes.70 It is vital to the function of the judicial system that
the obligation to follow precedent be of the utmost importance, because
“[t]he very concept of the rule of law underlying [the] . . . Constitution
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by
definition, indispensable.”71
When deciding whether a rule of law should or even could be
overturned, the Court takes a variety of factors into account. 72 The
Court weighs (1) “whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply
in defying practical workability;” (2) “whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;” (3) “whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine;” and (4) “whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.” 73 When
applying these factors to Roe, the Court determined that the

68. Id. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 979–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 854 (plurality opinion).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 854.
73. Id. at 854–55.
[I]n this case, [the Court] may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been
found unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could be
removed without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or
significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it; whether the
law’s growth in the intervening years has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal
anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe’s premises of fact have so
far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.
Id. at 855.
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underpinnings of Roe were not weakened in any way affecting the
central holding.74
While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An
entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of
liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to
make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty
or personal autonomy has left Roe’s central holding a doctrinal
remnant; Roe portends no developments at odds with other precedent
for the analysis of personal liberty; and no changes of fact have
rendered viability more or less appropriate as the point at which the
balance of interests tips. Within the bounds of normal stare decisis
analysis, then, and subject to the considerations on which it
customarily turns, the stronger argument is for affirming Roe’s
central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance any of
us may have, not for overruling it.75

If the case filed against the state of Georgia makes it to the Supreme
Court of the United States and certiorari is granted, the Court will
again weigh these factors when analyzing the central holding of Casey
and deciding whether or not to continue to uphold forty-five years of
precedent.
C. Continuing to Reaffirm Its Stance
Since the original decision in Roe and the subsequent decision in
Casey, the Court has continued to uphold its stance on the right to
abortion. In Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,76 the Court analyzed
the constitutionality of two provisions of a proposed abortion regulation
in Texas.77 The proposed regulation added an admitting-privileges
requirement, which required that the performing physician have active
admitting privileges at a hospital and be located within thirty miles of
the hospital where privileges are held on the date of the procedure, and
a surgical-center requirement, which required that the minimum
standard for an abortion facility be equivalent to the minimum
standards of an ambulatory surgical center. 78
States have a compelling interest in ensuring the safety of all
persons undergoing medical procedures.79 However, if the means of

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 860.
Id. at 860–61.
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
Id. at 2300.
Id.
Id. at 2309.
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protecting a state’s interest place a substantial burden on a woman’s
right to choose pre-viability, then the regulation is unconstitutional. 80 A
law that mandates unnecessary health regulations on abortion clinics
and consequentially places a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion constitutes an undue burden, even if its
purpose is an attempt to ensure the safety of the women undergoing the
procedure.81 The Court upheld the law announced in Casey and
concluded that neither provision of the Texas law contributed enough
medical benefit to justify the burden that the law placed on a woman’s
access to abortion.82
III. LIVING INFANTS FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY (LIFE) ACT
Women’s right to bodily autonomy and the right to terminate a
pregnancy pre-viability is a “rule of law and a component of liberty we
cannot renounce.”83 Yet that is exactly what the state of Georgia is
attempting to do by passing the new abortion law that was previously
set to take effect in January 2020. However, the constitutionality of the
law and whether it will eventually be permitted to take effect are still to
be determined. Before discussing the changes that the new law makes,
it is important to understand the current abortion law that is in effect
in Georgia.
A. The Law in Georgia as it Currently Stands
The current abortion law in effect in Georgia provides that “[n]o
abortion is authorized or shall be performed if the probable gestational
age of the unborn child has been determined in accordance with Code
Section 31-9B-2 to be 20 weeks or more.”84 Section 31-9B-2(a) provides
that “no abortion shall be performed or attempted to be performed
unless the physician performing it has first made a determination of the
probable gestational age of the unborn child or relied upon such a
determination made by another physician.” 85 This section also provides

80. Id.
81. Id. The Court must weigh the burden the law imposes on a woman’s access to
abortion with the benefit that the law could confer on the woman. Id.
82. Id. at 2300.
83. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
84. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-141(c)(1) (2019) (to be superseded by O.C.G.A. § 16-12-141(b)).
The new law was originally set to go into effect and supersede the current code sections on
January 1, 2020. However, the preliminary injunction that was granted on October 1,
2019 will prevent to law from taking effect until the case on the merits can be heard.
Order, supra note 11.
85. O.C.G.A. § 31-9B-2(a) (2019) (to be superseded by O.C.G.A. § 31-9B-2(a)).
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an exception for the case of medical emergencies. 86 There are several
other restrictions and regulations placed on the procedure, such as
requiring all abortions after the first trimester to be performed in a
hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or health facility licensed as an
abortion facility by the Department of Public Health.87
While not the most liberal abortion law that can be found in the
United States, the Georgia law, as it currently stands, conforms to
current Supreme Court precedent. The law does not prohibit a woman
from freely being able to choose whether to have an abortion previability, because it allows the procedure to be performed so long as the
gestational age has been determined to be 20 weeks or less by a
physician.88 The law also does not place an undue burden on a woman’s
right to choose, because it does not place any substantial obstacles in
her path pre-viability.89
Although the law is compliant with the constitutional standard set
by the Supreme Court, it still places some barriers on a woman’s ability
to easily obtain an abortion. Before receiving an abortion, a woman
must receive counseling that tends to deter her from making the
decision to have the abortion.90 There is also a mandatory twenty-four
hour waiting period between the counseling session and the
performance of the procedure.91 While these barriers could be
considered a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman easily
obtaining an abortion, they have not been found to place an undue
burden on the woman and therefore remain constitutional.
B. The Changes the LIFE Act Will Make to Georgia’s Abortion Law
As it was passed, the LIFE Act makes several significant changes to
the current abortion law. The most significant change is to the time
period when a woman may obtain an abortion. The LIFE Act proposes
to change the period when a woman may freely obtain an abortion from
twenty weeks to roughly six weeks. 92 The LIFE Act provides that “[n]o
abortion is authorized or shall be performed if an unborn child has been
determined in accordance with Code Section 31-9B-2 to have a

86. Id.
87. 20 GA. JUR. Abortion § 44.4 Restrictions and requirements for performance of an
abortion (2019).
88. 20 GA. JUR. Abortion § 44:3 Right to an abortion; state interest (2019).
89. Id.
90. Krause, supra note 9.
91. Id.
92. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, § 4, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 234 (amending O.C.G.A. § 16-12141(c)(1)).
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detectable human heartbeat.”93 Section 31-9B-2 has been amended to
provide that “[n]o abortion shall be performed or attempted to be
performed unless the physician performing such procedure has first
made a determination of the presence of a detectable human heartbeat,
as such term is defined in Code Section 1-2-1, of an unborn child.”94
This section still provides an exception for medical emergencies.95
Section 1-2-1 adds two new definitions, including a new class of
people that is now recognized by the state. A “detectable human
heartbeat” is now defined as an “embryotic or fetal cardiac activity or
the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the heart within the
gestational sac.”96 The Act also now recognizes an “unborn child” as a
class of people and defines it as “a member of the species Homo sapiens
at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.” 97 The current
version of section 1-2-1 does not recognize an unborn child as a class of
people.98 In essence, these changes will make it so that no abortion will
be performed once a fetus has reached roughly six weeks in gestational
age, before most women realize that they are even pregnant. These
changes are the main basis for the argument that the new law will be
found to be an intrusion of a woman’s liberty, because it places an
undue burden on a woman’s right to choose when to terminate a
pregnancy pre-viability and is therefore unconstitutional.
C. Floor Statements, Press Releases, and Signing Statements
The Bill has been controversial since the day it was first introduced
on the House floor. The Bill received a large amount of news coverage
throughout the legislative process, and many people spoke out both in
agreement and in vehement opposition with the Bill.
A video of Democratic Senator Jen Jordan’s floor speech opposing the
Bill and critiquing the legal implications for women and their
physicians went viral prior to the passing of the Bill.99 In her speech,

93. Id.
94. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, § 10, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 234 (amending O.C.G.A. § 319B-2(a)).
95. Id.
96. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, § 3, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 234 (creating new O.C.G.A. § 12-1(e)(1)).
97. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, § 3, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 234 (creating new O.C.G.A. § 12-1(e)(2)).
98. O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1 (2019) (to be superseded by O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1).
99. Jennifer Rainey Marquez, Georgia Senator Jen Jordan on her HB 481 speech:
“The least that women should be given is the ability to control our bodies,” ATLANTA
MAGAZINE, https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/georgia-senator-jen-
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Senator Jordan discussed the eight miscarriages she had during the
time when she and her husband were attempting to have a baby and
the physical and mental turmoil she er and her husband underwent. 100
Jordan stated that the reason she decided to talk openly about this
incredibly personal experience was in an attempt to start a real
conversation about the toll pregnancy takes on a woman’s body,
relationships, ability to get and keep a job, and access to healthcare. 101
On May 7, 2019, while signing the Bill into law, Governor Kemp
acknowledged that the law would more than likely face an immediate
legal challenge.102 He went on to claim that his administration was
prepared for the impending legal battle over the constitutionality of the
law.103 Kemp stated that it was his higher calling to protect life at all
stages.104 He thanked his fellow Republicans for rejecting the status quo
and pushing to impose new limits on abortion.105
In a press release shortly following the signing of the Bill, Elizabeth
Smith, the Chief Counsel for the Center For Reproductive Rights,
stated that the intention of the Georgia Legislature when enacting the
LIFE Act was to hopefully cause enough of a split in the circuit courts
that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari and overturn the
current precedent.106 Smith went on to say that the Georgia law is
bafflingly unconstitutional, because even if a woman is able to find out
she is pregnant within the roughly six week timeframe during which
the procedure remains legal, it would be nearly impossible for her to
obtain an abortion before the six-week cutoff.107
Several other organizations that are actively fighting to keep the law
from taking effect have spoken out about the negative effects the law
will have in Georgia. Sean Young, the legal director of the American
Civil Liberties Union of Georgia (ACLU) called the law “blatantly
unconstitutional” when analyzed under nearly fifty years of Supreme

jordan-on-her-hb-481-speech-the-least-that-women-should-be-given-is-the-ability-tocontrol-our-bodies/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Chuck, supra note 10.
103. Patricia Mazzei & Alan Blinder, Georgia Governor Signs ‘Fetal Heartbeat’
Abortion Law, THE NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/us/heartbeatbill-georgia.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
104. Bill Chappell, Georgia Abortion Providers File Federal Suit Against State’s ‘Fetal
Heartbeat’ Law, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/736946045/georgia-abortionproviders-file-federal-suit-against-states-fetal-heartbeat-law (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
105. Id.
106. Krause, supra note 9.
107. Id.
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Court precedent.108 He also stated that politicians should never be
permitted to second guess a woman’s health care decisions, nor tell a
woman or couple “when to start or expand a family.” 109 Monica
Simpson, the executive director of SisterSong Women of Color
Reproductive Justice Collective (SisterSong), stated that her group
intended to bring the suit against the state of Georgia “to protect
maternal health and reproductive rights so that every person—
especially persons of color—can thrive in their families and
communities as well as maintain their human right to make their own
decisions about their reproductive lives.” 110 The main theme of all these
statements, whether they were made by people advocating for
restriction of abortion or advocating for women’s reproductive rights
and liberty, seems to be that the law on its face is unconstitutional.
D. The Fight Begins in Georgia
On June 28, 2019, SisterSong, along with eleven other plaintiffs, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia against Governor Kemp and twelve other defendants,
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.111 The suit is a

108. Chuck, supra note 10.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Complaint, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective et. al. v.
Kemp et. al., No. 1:19-CV-02973 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2019). The Plaintiffs for the case
include: SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, on behalf of itself
and its members; Feminist Women’s Health Center; Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc.;
Atlanta Comprehensive Wellness Clinic; Atlanta Women’s Medical Center; Femhealth
USA d/b/a Carafem; Columbus Women’s Health Organization, P.C.; Summit Medical
Associates, P.C., on behalf of themselves, their physicians and other staff, and their
patients; Carrie Cwiak, M.D., M.P.H.; Lisa Haddad, M.D., M.S., M.P.H.; and Eva
Lathrop, M.D., M.P.H., on behalf of themselves and their patients. The Defendants
include: Brian Kemp, Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity;
Christopher M. Carr, Georgia Attorney General, in his official capacity; Kathleen Toomey,
Georgia Commissioner for Department of Public Health, in her official capacity; John S.
Antalis, M.D., Gretchen Collins, M.D., Debi Dalton, M.D., E. Daniel DeLoach, M.D.,
Charmaine Faucher, PA-C, Michael Fowler, Sr., C.F.S.P., Alexander S. Gross, M.D.,
Thomas Hardin Jr., M.D., Rob Law, C.F.A., Matthew W. Norman, M.D., David W.
Retterbush, M.D., Andrew Reisman, M.D., Joe Sam Robinson, M.D., Barby J. Simmons,
D.O., and Richard L. Weil, M.D., Members of the Georgia Composite Medical Board, in
their official capacities; LaSharn Hughes, M.B.A., Executive Director of Georgia
Composite Medical Board, in her official capacity; Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney
for Fulton County, in his official capacity; Sherry Boston, District Attorney for DeKalb
County, in her official capacity; Julia Slater, District Attorney for the Chattahoochee
Judicial Circuit, in her official capacity; John Melvin, Acting District Attorney for the
Cobb Judicial Circuit, in his official capacity; Danny Porter, District Attorney for the
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constitutional challenge to Georgia House Bill 481, the LIFE Act. 112 The
complaint rests on the grounds that the law is in direct conflict with
Roe v. Wade and the forty-five years of precedent that continues to
reaffirm the Court’s central holding in Roe.113 The plaintiffs allege that
the law will prevent people in the state from freely exercising their
fundamental right to choose when to have an abortion and that taking
away that right will cause irreparable harm.114 The plaintiffs also allege
that the law violates a woman’s right to privacy and liberty as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.115
1. Factual and Statistical Basis of the Complaint
The complaint lists and discusses a variety of factual and statistical
arguments for why the law should not be permitted to take effect.
Around one in four women nationally will have an abortion by age fortyfive. Sixty-one percent of those women already have at least one child,
and sixty-six percent also plan to have a child or additional children in
the future.116 The decision to terminate a pregnancy is deeply personal
and goes to a person’s core moral values, religious beliefs, and
individual
familial,
medical,
educational,
and
financial
circumstances.117 This law would force a woman to continue a
pregnancy against her will, which can pose a detrimental risk to her
mental and emotional health and even her life.118 The law also poses a
risk to a woman’s physical health, which would only increase Georgia’s
already exceedingly high maternal mortality rate. 119 The greatest

Gwinnett Judicial Circuit, in his official capacity; and Meg Heap, District Attorney for the
Eastern Judicial Circuit, in her official capacity. Id.
112. Id. at para. 1.
113. Id. at para. 2.
114. Id. at para. 6.
115. Id. at para. 73.
116. Id. at para. 47.
117. Id. at para. 46. Some of the reasons women seek abortions include being able to
leave an abusive partner, preserving their life or health by reducing their risk of injury or
death, because they have become pregnant as a result of rape or incest, and because they
do not want to have children at all. Id.
118. Id. at para. 61.
119. Chuck, supra note 10. In fact, Georgia already has one of the highest maternal
mortality rates in the nation. The increased risk this law imposes on maternal mortality
would likely push Georgia to the top of the list. Id.
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impact will be felt in rural areas, where low-income residents are
already the least able to access proper medical care. 120
2. The Defendants’ Answer
The defendants filed their answer on August 19, 2019. 121 As
expected, the defendants denied almost all allegations made in the
complaint.122 In the first paragraph, the defendants make a special note
to “deny all allegations in the complaint that killing a living unborn
child constitutes ‘medical care’ or ‘health care.’” 123 The defendants were
unable to respond to the allegation that a heartbeat is generally
detectable around six weeks using an ultrasound, due to the ambiguity
of the term “ultrasound.”124 The defendants go on to deny this
allegation, stating that a heartbeat may not be detectable until nine or
twelve weeks depending on which type of ultrasound is used. 125 In their
affirmative defenses, the defendants claim that the constitutionality of
the LIFE Act is based on the “State’s interests in protecting the life of
the unborn; promoting respect for life at all stages of pregnancy;
protecting maternal health and safety; and safeguarding the ethics and
integrity of the medical profession.” 126 The constitutionality of these
claims as well as the claims alleged in the complaint will be determined
when the court hears the case on the merits sometime in 2020.
3. Round One in Court
On September 23, 2019, the first hearing was held before Judge
Steve Jones of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.127 The plaintiffs asked the court to grant a
120. Chappell, supra note 104.
121. Answer, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective et. al. v.
Kemp et. al., No. 1:19-CV-02973 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2019).
122. Id.
123. Id. at para. 1. It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs make no mention of this
allegation anywhere in their complaint. See Complaint, supra note 111.
124. Answer, supra note 121, at para. 50. The defendants were also unable to respond
to the allegation that some women seek abortions for a variety of deeply personal reasons
due to the term “some women” being too ambiguous or vague. Id. at para. 46.
125. Id. at para. 50. The defendants do not make an attempt to differentiate between
the various types of ultrasounds, nor do they provide examples of when or what type of
ultrasound would cause a heartbeat to be undetectable until nine or twelve weeks.
126. Id. at para. 2 (affirmative defenses).
127. Ross Terrell, First Hearing Held on Injunction Against Georgia’s ‘Heartbeat’
Abortion Law, GPB NEWS, https://www.gpbnews.org/post/first-hearing-held-injunctionagainst-georgias-heartbeat-abortion-law (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
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temporary injunction to keep the law from taking effect on January 1,
2020 until the underlying constitutional issues have been decided. 128
Susan Talcott Camp, one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in
the case, argued that the law violates a woman’s constitutional right to
abortion as defined in Roe and Casey, and that no state interest was
strong enough to justify a ban on abortion pre-viability.129 Camp
reasoned that the main purpose behind the law was to ban abortion
entirely.130
Patrick Strawbridge, a lawyer representing the State, argued that
the law does not violate a woman’s constitutional right to abortion
because it still allows access to abortion up to the detection of a fetal
heartbeat.131 Strawbridge also argued that the Supreme Court has not
answered the specific constitutional questions raised by the heartbeat
restriction.132
On October 1, 2019, Judge Jones granted the temporary injunction,
which will keep the Act from taking effect on January 1, 2020. 133 In the
order, Judge Jones stated that neither the Supreme Court nor the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has overruled
Roe or Casey, and therefore the district court is bound by the current
precedent.134 Jones also stated that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits of the case, because the restriction the LIFE Act places on
abortion once a heartbeat is detected, months before viability, is a direct
violation of current precedent that prohibits states from placing an
undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion pre-viability.135
This ruling likely did not come as a surprise to either the plaintiffs or
the defendants in the case. Both sides have already announced that
they are preparing for the pending appeal. It is unclear how the court of
appeals will rule on the case, but it will likely also determine that it is

128. Id.
129. Maya T. Prabhu, Federal Judge Hears Arguments to Halt Georgia’s New AntiAbortion Law, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, https://www.ajc.com/news/state—
regional-govt—politics/federal-judge-hears-arguments-halt-georgia-new-anti-abortionlaw/fzQvFaCqx7T0YAnVW1i4ZP/# (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
130. Kate Brumback, Judge Hears Arguments in Challenge to Georgia Abortion Law,
AP NEWS, https://www.apnews.com/70cdf3014fc448e2bf0266c93af26f86 (last visited Nov.
14, 2019).
131. Id. The LIFE Act makes exceptions in the case of rape and incest, as long as the
woman has filed a police report prior to attempting to obtain an abortion, when the life of
the woman is at risk, or when the fetus is determined not to be viable by a physician. Id.
132. Prabhu, supra note 129.
133. Order, supra note 11.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 30–32.
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bound by the current Supreme Court precedent. Even if the court of
appeals rules in favor of the LIFE Act being constitutional, this ruling
would likely create a circuit split, which would almost certainly clear
the path up to the Supreme Court. The LIFE Act was passed as an
attempt to reach the Supreme Court, and the granting of the
preliminary injunction is the first step in a long journey that both
parties are eagerly awaiting.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LIFE ACT AND
POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS IF THE CURRENT PRECEDENT IS OVERTURNED
A. Analyzing the Constitutionality of the LIFE Act
The current precedent regarding abortion law was decided over
twenty-five years ago when the Supreme Court decided Casey. That
decision has remained untouched for decades and has continuously
been reaffirmed, including most recently in 2016. Since the precedent
for abortion law seems to be solidified, the proper analysis for whether
or not an abortion statute is constitutional is the undue burden
standard that the Court announced in its decision in Casey.
When analyzed using the undue burden test, the Georgia LIFE Act
should be held unconstitutional. The bill prohibits abortions from being
performed once a fetal heartbeat has been detected. This detection
normally occurs around the sixth gestational week. Since a fetal
heartbeat is first detected during the pre-viability period of a
pregnancy, the proper analysis for the constitutionality of the
restriction is the undue burden standard. The advocates of the law
argue that this roughly six-week window is enough time for a woman
who wishes to obtain an abortion to do so without a substantial obstacle
in her way. However, most women do not even know they are pregnant
at the six-week mark, particularly women who have irregular
menstrual cycles, women who have certain medical conditions such as
endometriosis, women on certain birth controls that do not allow them
to menstruate, and women who are breastfeeding. For many women,
the six-week window will have come and gone long before they realize
they are pregnant. The fetal heartbeat restriction places a substantial
obstacle in the way of most, if not all, women’s right to choose to obtain
an abortion, and all but forces them to carry the fetus to term.
The Supreme Court has recognized for over forty-five years that
states have a compelling interest in protecting potential life once the
fetus has reached the point of viability. However, the compelling
interest argument for the LIFE Act fails, because the LIFE Act restricts
abortion far before the point of viability. Many advocates for the LIFE
Act argue that the point of viability has changed since the time period
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when Casey was decided due to advances in medicine and technology.
However, in most cases, viability is still roughly twenty-four weeks, or
when a fetus is far enough along in development so as to allow it to
survive outside of the womb with medical assistance. 136 If a state’s
interest is grounded in wanting to protect potential life, the interest
does not attach until there is potential life, which does not become
apparent until the twenty-four week viability mark when the fetus is
capable of life outside of the womb. The state of Georgia does not have
enough of a compelling interest, if any interest at all, to abrogate a
woman’s right to an abortion prior to the viability period when the fetus
has no chance of surviving outside the womb, even with the use of
medical assistance.
One of the main points in both Roe and Casey is that a woman’s right
to obtain an abortion is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though the dissent
in Casey attempted to renounce abortion as being a fundamental right,
the Court has since reaffirmed that the right to abortion is a right
grounded in the Constitution.137 Georgia is encroaching on women’s
fundamental right to bodily autonomy by passing a law that restricts
the time period when an abortion can be obtained so much that it all
but eliminates the right completely.
The LIFE Act places a substantial burden on women attempting to
obtain an abortion pre-viability by placing a restriction on the
procedure once a fetal heartbeat has been detected. The interest the
state claims to have in the fetus pre-viability is not compelling enough
to allow it to override a woman’s fundamental rights. The LIFE Act as
it is currently written places an undue burden on women’s right to
choose and is therefore unconstitutional.
B. Determining if Casey Should be Overturned
If the case challenging the LIFE Act, or any case against one of the
many other statutes attempting to outlaw abortion, makes it up to the
Supreme Court, the Court will likely use the same factors it used to
analyze Roe to determine if Casey should now be overturned.138 As it did

136. When is it Safe to Deliver Your Baby, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HEALTH,
https://healthcare.utah.edu/womenshealth/pregnancy-birth/preterm-birth/when-is-it-safeto-deliver.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
137. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292, 2300.
138. The factors used to analyze Roe include: (1) “whether the rule has proven to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability;” (2) “whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
add inequality to the cost of repudiation;” (3) “whether related principles of law have so
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for Roe, the Court will consider (1) if the central holding of Casey could
be found unworkable; (2) if the rule’s limitation on state power could be
removed without serious inequity to those who have relied on it or
would cause significant damage to the society that has been governed
by it; (3) if the rule’s growth in the intervening years has left the central
holding of Casey a doctrinal anachronism; (4) and if the underlying facts
upon which Casey is based have changed so much in the last twentyseven years so as to render the central holding irrelevant or
unjustifiable in dealing with the issues it addressed. 139
The undue burden standard of analysis announced in Casey, while
not favored by some, has not been found to be unworkable in the last
twenty-seven years. The Court has continued using the undue burden
standard when analyzing abortion laws, including in the most recent
case decided in 2016.140 Removing the pre-viability limitation on a state
being permitted to regulate abortion would cause serious inequity to the
women who are relying on the right to choose to end a pregnancy previability, because it would permit a state to all but ban abortion outside
of the small window of time prior to a heartbeat being detected. It
would also cause significant damage to the society that has been relying
on the rights guaranteed in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey for the last
forty-five years. Since Casey was decided, multiple generations have
come of age assuming that there is a guaranteed right to privacy and
bodily autonomy when defining the capacity of women to act in society
and in making reproductive decisions. The principals of privacy, liberty,
and bodily autonomy have not changed or developed in the last fortyfive years in a way that would cause the central holding of Casey to be
inappropriate in the current time period. The facts upon which Casey is
based have not changed so much as to render the central holding
irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with abortion. Women still seek
abortions for the same reasons as they did when Casey was decided, and
the need to protect women’s right to obtain abortions free from
interference by the state pre-viability is more relevant than ever before.
The viability threshold that was announced in Casey remains relevant,
because technology has not advanced so much in the intervening years
that would cause the pre-viability limitation on a state’s interest to be
unjustifiable. While there is still some argument for modification or

far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine;”
(4) “or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55.
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
140. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
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clarification of the rule announced in Casey, the stronger argument is
for reaffirming Casey instead of overruling it.
C. A Hypothetical: If Roe and Casey Are Overturned
The LIFE Act is an apparent attempt by the opponents of abortion to
have the Supreme Court reevaluate the rules announced first in Roe
and reaffirmed in Casey. However, if the Supreme Court did choose to
hear a new case regarding abortion law, the outcome would not be a
total ban and criminalization of abortion as some advocates for the
LIFE Act would have people believe. Just as Casey was a reaffirmation
but modification to Roe, the new rule would be a reaffirmation but
modification of Casey. No matter the political structure of the Supreme
Court, there will not be a time where the Court announces that women
do not have a fundamental right over their own bodily autonomy.
Retracting rights from a class of people would digress society back
hundreds of years and cause civil unrest. Instead, the Court would
reaffirm that a woman does have a fundamental right to privacy that is
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
just as they have done for almost half a century.
The change would be to when a state’s compelling interest would be
permitted to override a woman’s fundamental rights. Currently a state
generally does not have a compelling interest in the preservation of
potential life and cannot place an undue burden on a woman’s right to
choose pre-viability. However, the Court would likely severely reduce or
completely eliminate the viability threshold. One of the major
arguments for why abortions should be prohibited after a fetal
heartbeat is detected is that advances in technology have radically
reduced the time frame for when a fetus is considered viable. If the
Court finds merit in this argument, then it may allow a state to
regulate or ban abortion at earlier stages in a woman’s pregnancy and
claim that it is due to the compelling interest in protecting potential
human life. The undue burden standard would likely continue to
survive since the Court would not renounce a woman’s fundamental
right to privacy, and it would not revert back to using the trimester
framework. So long as abortion is permitted without any substantial
obstacles in the way of a woman attempting to obtain an abortion prior
to a fetal heartbeat being detected, the Court would hold that there is
no undue burden and would uphold restrictions such as the heartbeat
regulation in the LIFE Act.

[21] COMMENT - SIZEMORE BP (DO NOT DELETE)

440

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:32 AM

[Vol. 71

D. The Impact on Georgia if the LIFE Act Takes Effect
There are many speculative effects that the LIFE Act could have on
Georgia, including plummeting maternal mortality rates, which are
already alarmingly high, and an immeasurably negative impact on
women’s mental health, jobs, economic stability, education, and
relationships. However, one effect that is not quite as speculative is
what the LIFE Act could mean for the Georgia film industry.
Georgia’s entertainment tax incentives have brought more than
92,000 jobs and nearly $4.6 billion in wages to the state since 2008. 141
The state has been home to many lucrative productions such as Black
Panther and The Walking Dead.142 However, major production
companies such as Netflix, NBC Universal, Warner Media, AMC, CBS,
Showtime, Sony Pictures, and Disney have all voiced concerns about the
bill and threatened to reevaluate their investment in the state. 143 On
May 28, 2019, Netflix released a statement saying that it would
withdraw all of its business from the state if the law went into effect. 144
JJ Abrams and Jordan Peele announced that they would continue to
shoot their HBO series, Lovecraft Country, in the state, but plan to
donate one hundred percent of the profits from this season to the
organizations fighting to keep the LIFE Act from taking effect. 145 The
potential impact to Georgia would be devastating if the LIFE Act is
eventually permitted to take effect.
V. CONCLUSION
While the future of abortion law in the state of Georgia and in the
United States is unnervingly uncertain, it is evident that there is a long
road ahead for advocates on both sides of the argument. The LIFE Act
is unconstitutional under current precedent and will not be taking
effect in the immediate future. However, the fight is just beginning.
There is a high likelihood that the case against the LIFE Act could
make it up to the Supreme Court and the constitutional right to
abortion will yet again come into question. While the stronger argument
is for reaffirming the central holding in Casey, the political climate of
141. Amanda Mull, What Hollywood Boycotts Would Really do to Georgia, THE
ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/06/georgia-abortionhollywood-boycotts/591106/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
142. Robyn Curnow, Battle lines are drawn between the film industry and Georgia over
controversial ‘heartbeat bill,’ CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/21/us/georgia-heartbeatlaw-film-industry/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
143. Mull, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Curnow, supra note 142.
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both the Supreme Court and the country makes it more uncertain than
ever how the Court will actually rule. If the Court chooses to modify
Casey or to overrule it entirely, the impact the change will have on the
women in this country will be catastrophic.

Brittney A. Sizemore
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